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ABSTRACT
Objective: To introduce otolaryngologists to outcomes-linked reimbursement (“pay-for-
performance”), identify clinical practice implications and recommend changes for
successful transition from the traditional “pay-for-effort” reimbursement model.
Study design: Policy review
Results: Payers are actively linking reimbursement to quality. Since the Institute of
Medicine issued its report on medical errors in 1999, there has been much public and
private concern over patient safety. In an effort to base health care payment on quality,
“pay-for-performance” programs reward or penalize hospitals and physicians for their
ability to maintain standards of care established by payers and regulatory groups. More
than 100 such programs are operational in the United States today. This reimbursement
model relies on detailed documentation in specific patient care areas to facilitate
evaluation of outcomes for purposes of determining reimbursement. Since performance
criteria for reimbursement have not yet been proposed within Otolaryngology-Head and
Neck Surgery, otolaryngologists must be involved to ensure the adoption of reasonable
goals and development of reasonable systems for documentation.
Conclusion: “Pay-for-performance” reimbursement is increasingly common in the current
era of outcomes-based medicine. It will assume an even greater role over the next 3
years and will directly affect most otolaryngologists.
3INTRODUCTION
Over 20 years ago, when the influence of managed care on the practice of
medicine was relatively weak, Starr1 described the history of medicine as “…a tale of
social and economic conflict over the emergence of new hierarchies of power and
authority, new markets, and new conditions of belief and experience”. He observed that
power is rooted in dependence. Unfortunately, physicians were still feeling independent
– and, thus, empowered - when this work was published. As a result, physicians
overestimated both their power and the strength of their resources compared to those of
corporate America.
Physicians allowed themselves to become commoditized (the state in which
competitors are differentiated from each other only by their cost), and reimbursement
dropped dramatically as they competed for patients in a reverse auction for payer
contracts. Patient flow was increased to maintain revenue streams with efforts such as
expanded scopes of practice and incorporation of alternative medicine into formerly
traditional practices. Few physicians questioned the quality of the care they provided,
and fewer still found or made the time to explore formal quality improvement in their
practices or their hospitals.
Meanwhile, the quality assurance movement was gaining momentum. Egdahl and
Gertman2 cited “…close to 1000 studies…to assess the level of quality of care delivered”.
They presented “…ample information to support the contention that simple, routine tasks
are not performed well in the American medical care system”. They concluded, perhaps
prematurely, that the need for “…better practice habits” was a primary cause.
4Whatever the reasons, and poor practice habits are certainly among them, routine
things are still not done well enough often enough in the American medical care system.
And the cost of suboptimal care is staggering. Once this became obvious to those who
pay for the bulk of American healthcare, they rapidly used market power to shift control
of healthcare dollars from the supply side (physicians) to the demand side (those who pay
physicians). The power to direct patient flow has shifted from physicians to employers,
who provide a reported 63% of American health insurance at an average cost of $6,966
per employee in 2003.3
Strong investor demand for shareholder return has placed new emphasis on the
contribution of healthcare costs to the prices of all goods and services. Compounding
this are what, to physicians, are disproportionately large compensation packages (linked
to shareholder return) for corporate executives.
The insurance industry dramatically underscores the growing influence of
shareholder demand and executive compensation throughout corporate America on
reimbursement for healthcare. A typical large healthcare insurer4 defines its executive
compensation philosophy as “…focus[ing] executives on increasing shareholder value by
awarding them stock-based compensation directly linked to improvements in Company
earnings and stock price”. Clear evidence of the success of this approach is found in their
reporting “…lower than expected healthcare cost[s for the company]” for 2004 ($1.89B)
in comparison with 2002 ($3B) and 2003 ($2.2B), a 14% drop despite a reported increase
in national healthcare expenditure5 from a reported $1.6B in 2002 to $1.8B in 2004. The
president of this insurer earned $3M in 2004, up from $2.3M in 2002 (a 30% increase in
two years). The CEO earned a reported $18.2M in 2003 and $22M in 2004 (a 21%
5increase in one year). Comparison with physician income over the same period is
invited.
Reducing employee healthcare costs has become a national priority for corporate
America. Initial reliance on the promises of managed care proved fruitless as physicians
and hospitals learned to work around the roadblocks set before them. Many recent
articles and books have dramatized the cost of medical errors, providing the impetus for
another strategic shift in health care cost containment: paying for performance.
DISCUSSION
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published it report, To Err is Human,6
raising public awareness of medical errors and sparking a revolution in quality of care
efforts. The report estimated that as many as 98,000 people die annually in the United
States as a result of preventable medical mistakes.
One recommendation of the report was that large purchasers of health care use
their power to affect the behaviors of health care providers by creating financial
incentives to ensure the safety of patients. Almost immediately, large employer
coalitions began to form to address that charge. This initiated a trend towards
performance-rewarding reimbursement that continues to progress at a very rapid pace.
This movement gained support after the IOM’s next report, Crossing the Quality Chasm,7
included the recommendation of alignment of payment policies with quality improvement
in its suggested redesign of our nation’s healthcare system. Meanwhile, a separate study
by HealthGrades, Inc. in 2004 garnered national media attention by raising concern that
the number of annual deaths due to medical errors was actually double the IOM’s
6estimate.8 A 2004 survey of members of the American Academy of Otolaryngology-
Head and Neck Surgery (AAO-HNS) demonstrates that our specialty is not immune to
error-making.9
Pay-for-performance (P4P) is based on rewarding health care providers for the
quality of their care with financial or other incentives. Traditionally, physician
reimbursement has reflected the type and quantity of care without measures of quality.
While most healthcare providers would like to claim that they only provide the highest
quality care, the reports by IOM and HealthGrades forces that into question. In addition,
the rates at which medical knowledge and technology advance make it increasingly
difficult for a physician to stay current with changing standards of care.
Two common P4P reimbursement models are the threshold and tiering
systems.10,11 In the threshold approach, a physician would be rewarded by meeting a
quota of requisite processes or outcomes. Alternatively, in the tiering approach,
providers would be ranked according to their achievements with the top performers being
rewarded. In this approach, providers do not know the requirements to receive the bonus,
because they do not know where they rank amongst their competition.
Proponents of P4P argue that it is an innovative way to improve the quality of
patient care while also lowering healthcare costs. Many concerns exist, however, that
patient care may actually suffer under a P4P model. Some argue that if physicians are
scored based on the compliance of their patients, it may drive doctors to avoid treating
noncompliant patients to protect their income and reputation.12 The same is true for the
more ill and complicated patients.10
7The most notable early initiatives driving P4P include The Leapfrog Group, the
Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA), and Bridges to Excellence (BTE). The
Leapfrog Group formed in 1998 when a group of large employers banded together to use
their purchasing power to have an influence on the quality and affordability of the
healthcare for their employees.13 They used the 1999 IOM report as their initial focus
and officially launched the The Leapfrog Group in 2000. The groups growing consortium
of over 170 companies including AT&T, Ford, Exxon, and Microsoft provide health
benefits to more than 36 million Americans. The Leapfrog Group has identified hospital
quality and safety practices that are the focus of its hospital recognitions and rewards, and
Leapfrog members have agreed to base their purchase of health care on principles that
encourage provider quality. The hospital quality and safety practices, which include
computer physician order entry, evidence-based hospital referral, and staffing in the
intensive care unit by critical care physicians, have all been independently proven to
reduce errors and mortality.
The IHA is a consortium that includes California’s seven major health plans and
other large corporations.14 The IHA introduced a tiering P4P system in 2003. The
measurement set for performance is categorized into 3 major groups: clinical indicators,
patient satisfaction, and information technology (IT) investment. IHA paid over $50
million in “performance” payments last year.
Similar to IHA is the national BTE coalition, which works in partnership with The
Leapfrog Group. BTE is a threshold based P4P that pays bonuses to physicians who
reach specified quality targets in diabetes management and cardiac care.15 Physicians are
8also rewarded if they institute certain systems for improving care, such as an electronic
health record (EHR) or patient registries.
Following the initiative of these groups, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) announced in February of this year that it planned a demonstration
project of P4P. This pilot effort, which began in April, involves 10 large medical groups
throughout the country. In March, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) annual report to Congress suggested that Medicare should begin paying all
physicians differently based on how they perform. This summer, separate bills were
introduced before the United States Senate and House of Representatives that could result
in all Medicare payments being linked to yet-to-be-determined federal quality measures.
The American Medical Association (AMA) has approached the P4P boom with
trepidation. There is concern that the true goal of these reimbursement systems is really
based on cost, not quality.10 The worry stems from the theory that P4P programs are
nothing more than new window dressings for withhold programs that harm patient care
by creating exclusive panels and limiting services.16 One supposed P4P model that
underscores these concerns is the UnitedHealth Performance pilot program in Missouri.
In this program physicians are designated “performance” physicians by passing quality
and efficiency screens. These physicians are differentially marked in the physician
directory to encourage patients to preferentially choose them. Rather than being
incentive driven, however, the patients in this program are discouraged from seeking care
from the UnitedHealth Group participating physicians who were not awarded
“performance” status by being required to pay 100 percent of the cost if they chose to do
9so. This has garnered intense criticism for creating obstacles to continuity of care and
breaking the patient-physician relationship.
To address such concerns, the AMA formulated a set of guidelines to be used to
assess whether P4P programs are fair and ethical.17 They announced the five principles
one day after MedPAC released its annual report to Congress. The principles require that
P4P programs ensure quality of care, foster the patient-physician relationship, offer
voluntary physician participation, use accurate and fair reporting, and provide fair and
equitable incentives. They specified that the incentives must be paid for by new funds.
Meanwhile, the Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance (AQA), formed last year by
the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American College of Physicians,
America’s Health Insurance Plans, and the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, worked to establish clinical performance measures for the ambulatory care
setting. They developed 26 criteria with the hope that they be used as uniform measures
across health plans and, as a result, reduce treatment standard inconsistencies and
administrative burden for physicians who deal with multiple payers.18 In August, the
National Quality Forum, who had been charged by Congress with establishing the
measures upon which Medicare payments would be based, adopted 36 quality standards
for the outpatient setting.19
A major focus of the P4P revolution is the widespread adoption of IT in the form
of an EHR to track and report patient data. Almost six years after the IOM’s report on
medical errors, some argue that the time has come for its universal use.15,20 The Leapfrog
Group cites that computer physician order entry has been shown to reduce serious
prescribing errors in hospitals by more than 50%.13 BTE offers bonuses for an EHR,15
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while the IHA weighs 20% of its P4P measures on investment in IT.14 Obviously, such
investments can result in considerable upfront costs. The AMA feels that P4P programs
should minimize such financial and technological barriers to physician participation and
hopes to avoid the development and requirement of health plan specific IT capabilities.14
Concerns that the reporting requirements of the current Congressional proposals
regarding a CMS P4P system will inevitably force participating physicians to make the
IT investment may be eased by the recent announcement that CMS will offer Vista, the
EHR developed by the Veterans Health Administration (VA), free of charge.
It is not yet evident how drastically the movement towards P4P will affect our
healthcare reimbursement system, but it is clear that a change is imminent. According to
a recent survey, 29 of the nation’s 51 Blues plans have launched a total of 37 P4P
programs in 32 states.21 Both the Senate and the House of Representatives are
considering bills concerning value-based purchasing, another name for P4P, for Medicare
and Medicaid. Although the bills are similar, significant differences exist that can have a
pronounced effect on CMS reimbursement rates.22 For example, the Medicare Value
Purchasing Act of 2005, which was introduced in the Senate, does not commit new
money for the performance “bonuses.” Instead, funding of the rewards would result in
reduction of the standard reimbursement rates. Furthermore, participation would
essentially be mandatory since physicians who are unable to report quality data would see
an automatic 2% reduction in their Medicare update. In addition, the bill does not
address the troubled current CMS reimbursement system, which is scheduled to result in
further reductions in the upcoming years. It fails to meet the AMA’s principles that call
for voluntary participation and the use of new funds. The more recently introduced
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Medicare Value-Based Purchasing for Physicians’ Services Act of 2005 being considered
in the House, on the other hand, would commit new money to the system and abandon
the current CMS physician reimbursement formula. Also, it would be voluntary, which
would put it further in line with the AMA’s principles. Finally, the bill explicitly calls for
physician specialists themselves to provide recommendations on how the government
should rate their quality of care. Although there are still concerns with the legislation, it
is an improvement in comparison to the Senate bill.
The effect that the P4P movement will have on specialists is even less clear. Most
of the currently defined measurements have been designed for primary care. In fact, of
the 26 measurements established by the AQA, only 3 (documentation of tobacco use,
smoking cessation advice, and streptococcal testing for children with pharyngitis) are
clearly and directly useful for performance evaluation of most otolaryngologists.
Specialists cannot be rated on performance without the establishment of standards on
which to judge them. Some are skeptical that appropriate standards can even be
established for our specialty. A recent poll posted on the website of the AAO-HNS found
that 97% of respondents did not think it was possible for health plans to have the right
kind of information to accurately identify which physicians meet a high-quality profile.23
RECOMMENDATIONS
Whether you are skeptical or optimistic, P4P is expanding, and there are things
that can be done to prepare for its spread to Otolaryngology – Head and Neck Surgery.
As individual physicians, otolaryngologists can embrace efforts to improve patient care
by practicing evidence-based medicine and maintaining appropriate documentation to
12
enable outcomes reporting. Adoption of an EHR should facilitate these efforts, and
would better prepare a practice for a change to a reward-based reimbursement system.
Although current P4P efforts have focused predominantly on primary care, there are
initiatives to improve surgical care. Familiarity with these projects is important, since it
is likely that any P4P program directed at surgical fields would be modeled after these
efforts. The Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP) is a national quality partnership
started by CMS and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention to reduce post-
operative complications.24 Its main targets are surgical site infections, adverse cardiac
events, venous thromboembolism, and postoperative pneumonia. The American College
of Surgeons’ National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) is modeled after
the VA program of the same name that resulted in a 27% decline in postoperative
mortality and a 45% drop in postoperative morbidity in the government sector.25 It is
important to note that the NSQIP is a risk-adjusted model, which should counter any
perceived disincentive for physicians to treat complicated patients. In 2002, the IOM
named the NSQIP “the best in the nation” for measuring and reporting surgical quality
and outcomes. Knowledge of these initiatives will help otolaryngologists prepare for
interventions applicable to all surgical specialties, but there are no performance
guidelines designed specifically for Otolaryngology – Head and Neck Surgery. As a
group, the AAO-HNS must define specialty-specific measures that can accurately
identify quality patient care within our field. The government is already indicating that it
may look to specialty groups for advice on such standards,22 and the AAO-HNS must be
prepared to seize that opportunity. Only physicians have the knowledge and experience
13
to ensure that such measures actually reflect enhanced patient care and provide the proper
quality-based incentives.
CONCLUSIONS:
Rewarding for quality care is a popular reimbursement trend that is expanding at a
rapid pace. Congress is considering legislation that would link Medicare payments to
quality measures, and P4P programs will inevitably spread to our specialty.
Otolaryngologists can prepare by practicing evidence-based medicine, investing in EHR
systems, and establishing specialty-specific quality care measures.
14
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TABLE 1
YEAR MONTH ACTION
1999 IOM publishes “To Err is Human”
2000 Leapfrog Group is launched
2003 Integrated Health Association introduces large-scale P4P in California
2004 HealthGrades issues its first report on medical errors
February CMS announces a P4P demonstration project
March Medicare Payment Advisory Committee recommends P4P to Congress for
all physicians
March AMA proposes principles of fairness for P4P programs
April CMS demonstration project begins for 10 large medical groups
June American Quality Alliance releases 26 clinical performance measures for
ambulatory care
July Separate House and Senate bills are introduced linking Medicare payment
to federal performance measures
August National Quality Forum adopts quality standards proposed as a Medicare
basis for payment
17
Table 2:
Potential drawbacks of P4P:
1. Small group practices may not have large enough sample sizes to meet
performance criteria of individual insurers
2. Incentives based on patient compliance could lead to physicians avoiding the care
of non-compliant patients.
3. Incentives based on patient outcomes could lead to physicians avoiding the care
of the complicated patients
4. Reporting requirements could result in increase practice costs
5. Funding for “rewards” could result in decreased reimbursement for “non-
performers”
6. Performance measures may not accurately judge physician quality
7. Performance standards have not been set for specialty practices
18
Table 3:
AMA’s five principles to evaluate a pay-for-performance program.
A P4P must:
1. Ensure quality of care.
2. Foster the patient-physicial relpationship
3. Offer voluntary physician participation
4. Use accurate and fair reporting
5. Provide fair and equitable incentives.
19
Table 4: Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance’s 26 performance measures
PREVENTION MEASURES
1. Breast Cancer Screening
Percentage of women who had a mammogram during the measurement year or year prior to the
measurement year.
2. Colorectal Cancer Screening
The percentage of adults who had an appropriate screening for colorectal cancer.
One or more of the following:
FOBT – during measurement year;
Flexible sigmoidoscopy - during the measurement year or the four years
prior to the measurement year;
DCBE – during the measurement year or the four years prior;
Colonoscopy – during the measurement or nine years prior.
3. Cervical Cancer Screening
Percentage of women who had one or more Pap tests during the measurement year or the two
prior years.
4. Tobacco Use
Percentage of patients who were queried about tobacco use one or more
times during the two-year measurement period.
5. Advising Smokers to Quit
Percentage of patients who received advice to quit smoking.
6. Influenza Vaccination
Percentage of patients [50-64] who received an influenza vaccination.
7. Pneumonia Vaccination
Percentage of patients who ever received a pneumococcal vaccine.
CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE (CAD)
8. Drug Therapy for Lowering LDL Cholesterol
Percentage of patients with CAD who were prescribed a lipid-lowering
therapy (based on current ACC/AHA guidelines).
9. Beta-Blocker Treatment after Heart Attack
Percentage of patients hospitalized with acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
who received an ambulatory prescription for beta-blocker therapy (within 7
days discharge).
10. Beta-Blocker Therapy – Post MI
Percentage patients hospitalized with AMI who received persistent beta-blocker treatment (6
months after discharge).
HEART FAILURE
11. ACE Inhibitor /ARB
Therapy# Percentage of patients with heart failure who also have LVSD who were prescribed
ACE inhibitor or ARB therapy.
12. LVF Assessment
Percentage of patients with heart failure with quantitative or qualitative
results of LVF assessment recorded.
4 Diabetes
13. HbA1C Management
Percentage of patients with diabetes with one or more A1C test(s) conducted during the
20
measurement year.
14. HbA1C Management Control
Percentage of patients with diabetes with most recent A1C level greater than
9.0% (poor control).
15. Blood Pressure Management
Percentage of patients with diabetes who had their blood pressure
documented in the past year less than 140/90 mm Hg.
16. Lipid Measurement
Percentage of patients with diabetes with at least one Low Density Lipoprotein cholesterol
(LDL-C) test (or ALL component tests).
17. LDL Cholesterol Level (<130mg/dL) Percentage of patients with diabetes with most recent
LDL-C less than 100 mg/dL or less than 130 mg/dL.
18. Eye Exam*
Percentage of patients who received a retinal or dilated eye exam by an eye
care professional (optometrist or ophthalmologist) during the reporting year
or during the prior year if patient is at low risk for retinopathy.
A patient is considered low risk if all three of the following criteria are met:
(1) the patient is not taking insulin; (2) has an A1C less than 8.0%; and (3)
has no evidence of retinopathy in the prior year.
ASTHMA
19. Use of Appropriate Medications for People w/ Asthma*
Percentage of individuals who were identified as having persistent asthma
during the year prior to the measurement year and who were appropriately
prescribed asthma medications (e.g. inhaled corticosteroids) during the
measurement year
20. Asthma: Pharmacologic Therapy#
Percentage of all individuals with mild, moderate, or severe persistent
asthma who were prescribed either the preferred long-term control
medication (inhaled corticosteroid) or an acceptable alternative treatment.
DEPRESSION
21. Antidepressant
Medication Acute Phase: Percentage of adults who were diagnosed with a new episode of
depression and treated with an antidepressant medication and remained on
Management* an antidepressant drug during the entire 84-day (12-week) Acute Treatment
Phase.
22. Antidepressant Medication Management* Continuation Phase: Percentage of adults who
were diagnosed with a new episode of depression and treated with an antidepressant medication
and remained on an antidepressant drug for at least 180 days (6 months).
PRENATAL CARE
23. Screening for Human Immunodeficiency Virus#
Percentage of patients who were screened for HIV infection during the first
or second prenatal visit.
24. Anti-D Immune Globulin
Percentage of D (Rh) negative, unsensitized patients who received anti-D immune globulin at 26-
30 weeks gestation.
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QUALITY MEASURES ADDRESSING OVERUSE OR MISUSE
25. Appropriate Treatment for Children with Upper Respiratory Infection (URI)*
Percentage of patients who were given a diagnosis of URI and were not
dispensed an antibiotic prescription on or 3 days after the episode date.
26. Appropriate Testing for Children with Pharyngitis*
Percentage of patients who were diagnosed with pharyngitis, prescribed an
antibiotic and who received a group A streptococcus test for the episode.
22
Table 5: 
Recommendations for Otolaryngologists:
1. Practice evidence-based medicine
2. Improve documentation and reporting capabilities by investing in an electronic
health record
3. Establish specialty-specific quality care measures
